It can be done, but it’s very hard to override. Then it would go for a presidential veto, which is hard to override. Well, it might pass the House perhaps, but it would still have to pass the Senate. Why did I write that? Well, if you think of the United States, for example, if a small majority in the House of Representatives wanted to pass an outrageous law curtailing the rights of some minorities, say after a terrorist attack or something else–it’s happened, of course, in history–but you could easily imagine a case like that. Reasonableness is really only one relatively small element in that. The goal of the sweeping program by the government was really to undo the one check on legislative and government decisions in Israel. It’s not a small element, but it’s only one element and small in comparison to the vast project that this government set out to limit the ability of the court to oversee or to override both legislative decisions and executive decisions. The first is that this issue of reasonableness is just one element. Pure, unbridled majoritarianism.” But in this new law, the prime minister says he’s fulfilling the will of the voters. And you said, quote, “In Netanyahu’s new Israel, the slimmest of majorities could decide anything. It is not unlike other administrative review processes in other countries, but it had become expansive and many people, including many on the opposition today, were actually open to some reform in it, but certainly not the reform the government has passed.ĭEWS: So, you wrote a piece, that’s on our website, in February about Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s efforts to limit the role of the Supreme Court. So, it is a special kind of thing in Israel. And especially was expanded in the 1980s and to include a lot more. All of these came under the umbrella of reasonableness in Israel. Rather, it would sometimes evaluate decisions by ministers, the government, or officials, which, for example, could have a conflict of interest or might not have even weighed the serious ramifications of a decision and made something whimsical, capricious decisions which in the United States could also be struck down. The court will not strike down any law, never struck down a law because it deemed it unreasonable. So, reasonableness does not apply to laws. It boils down to a judicial review of administrative decisions.
And the reasonableness doctrine came about there. And like in most common law systems, especially the British one, a lot of the legislative doctrine comes from history of judicial decisions.
It chose instead to have a gradual legislation, what’s known as basic laws, which we can think of as articles of the constitution. It does not have a clearly defined constitution. SACHS: Well, Israel operates with a common law system. What is the reasonableness doctrine that the new law has changed? Good to be with you.ĭEWS: So, let’s talk about the context first of what’s happened. To discuss what’s happening in Israel, I’m joined by Natan Sachs, director of the Center for Middle East Policy at Brookings and a senior fellow in Foreign Policy. Passage of the bill has sparked turmoil in the country, with demonstrations in Tel Aviv, Air Force reservists saying they will not report for duty, and the country’s doctors saying they will go on strike. The so-called “reasonableness bill” passed with a 64 to 0 vote after all members of the Knesset’s governing coalition voted for it and all members of the opposition left the chamber. On Monday, Israel’s Knesset passed a bill that strips Israel’s Supreme Court of the power to declare government decisions unreasonable. Now I’m joining my colleague Adriana Pita as co-host of The Current, giving you more analysis from Brookings scholars on breaking news and current policy conversations. I’m Fred Dews, former host of the Brookings Cafeteria podcast, which you can still find on our website at Brookings dot edu slash podcasts. DEWS: You’re listening to The Current, part of the Brookings Podcast Network.
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